The School of Business and Economics research committee has organized a time to hear from our newest faculty members. Three assistant professors: Joshua Filzen, Saurav Pathak, and Liang Song, will present a synopsis of their current research on October 18th, 2011, from 4:00 to 5:30 pm on Chem Sci 108. There will be time for questions and answers and the last half hour will be devoted for networking with our new colleagues.
My current research examines the interaction of disclosure and firm properties, such as future firm performance, ability to meet earnings benchmarks, earnings management, and valuation. I am currently studying qualitative characteristics of corporate disclosure, utilizing the Python programming language to extract and measure disclosure in periodic reports. I plan to briefly discuss three projects I am working on, in various stages of development, related to this topic.
My research underlines the mechanism of interaction between context and individual’s entrepreneurial behaviors. It thus recognizes the multi-level nature of entrepreneurship and employs multi-level methodological treatment to data available on individual’s entrepreneurial actions and on the focal entrepreneur’s context. The research accounts for the variance that exists in individuals’ propensity to engage in entrepreneurship across cultures, social reference groups, organizations, etc. My research findings present a socialized view of the entrepreneurial process and suggest that context not only exercises regulatory influences on individuals’ propensity to enter into entrepreneurship but also on their persistence in it and on entrepreneurial growth aspirations.
Real versus Accrual-Based Earnings Management and the Market for Corporate Control
In this paper, we use the passage of state antitakeover laws in the U.S. as a source of an exogenous variation in the market for corporate control in order to identify the preferences of the entrenched manager in employing real and accrual-based earnings management. We find that total earnings management activities, measured by firms’ probability of conducting either accrual-based or real earnings management activities, declined following the passage of antitakeover laws. This implies that entrenched managers are more likely to enjoy a quiet life to fulfill their own interest. In addition, managers switched from accrual-based earnings management activities to earnings management by real activities. This suggests that entrenched managers care less about the severe economic consequences after applying real earnings management while taking advantage of its less likelihood to be detected. Finally, reduced firm performance after the passage of antitakeover laws is attributed to greater real earnings management activities than accrual-based earnings management.