Paper from Security and Privacy Lab Wins Best Paper Award at SmartSP ’24 Conference

Undergraduate Josh Dafoe, computer science and mathematics, is one of the authors who earned recognition for the paper.

A paper by Josh Dafoe, Job Siy, Niusen Chen, and Bo Chen has received the Best Paper Award at the 2024 EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems and Smart Vehicles (SmartSP ’24). It is the sole best paper award among the 19 accepted papers in the conference, which took place November 7-8 in New Orleans, Louisiana.

The paper is titled, “Hardware-assisted Runtime In-vehicle ECU Firmware Self-attestation and Self-repair.”

Dafoe (mathematics and computer science) and Siy (computer engineering) are Michigan Tech undergraduate students working in the Security and Privacy (SnP) lab at Michigan Tech, which is directed by co-author Bo Chen, associate professor in the Department of Computer Science. Niusen Chen ’23 (PhD in Computer Science) is now an assistant professor at University of Wisconsin-La Crosse.

Paper Abstract

Modern vehicles are largely controlled by many embedded computers, known as Electronic Control Units (ECUs). The increased use of ECUs has brought many in-vehicle security concerns. Specifically, injection of malware into ECUs poses a significant risk to vehicle operation. Indeed, many ECU malware injection attacks have been performed, and much work has been introduced towards mitigating these vulnerabilities. A main defense is for ECUs to perform a self-attestation over their firmware state. However, most current self-attestation solutions do not enable runtime checking due to their high computational cost. Additionally, existing solutions mostly do not incorporate any ECU self-repairing in coordination with the attestation mechanisms.

In this work, we have designed FSAVER, a highly efficient self-attestation and self-repair framework for in-vehicle ECUs. For the self-attestation, we adapt highly efficient spot-checking techniques, so that the firmware can be checked periodically at runtime. To perform these attestations, we rely on the TEE already equipped within each ECU. For self-repair, we take advantage of the isolated flash memory controller (FMC) in the storage device. Specifically, we coordinate it with the update mechanism and self-attestations to guarantee that the latest benign firmware version can always be restored. To realize this while malware is running, a special mechanism has been carefully developed to notify the FMC of the malicious presence.

Citation

Josh Dafoe, Job Siy, Niusen Chen, and Bo Chen. Hardware-assisted Runtime In-vehicle ECU Firmware Self-attestation and Self-repair. 2024 EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems and Smart Vehicles (SmartSP ’24), New Orleans, LA, November 2024.